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Science and Social Relevance
BY GERALD HOLTON

I was very flattered to be asked here by your Association to the
beautiful campus of Colgate University. Particular thanks should be
offered to my good friend, Dr. Henshaw, who has here been holding
the flag high for General Education in the sciences. I know this is
not a very easy task. That he has done it so well is a measure of both
the place and the man.
Having struggled myself with various experiments in G eneral
Education over the years, what I'd like to talk about today are not
any of the successes but rather some of the problems, particularly
the problems that I see coming to us faster and faster in this business
of bringing education in science to students who, many of them, are
turning away from science and all it stands for.
I heard a story once from Noel Baker about Sir Thomas Beecham,
a story that seems to me to touch on the kind of irreconcilable hostility we sometimes have to deal with in our own work as instructors.
Sir Thomas used to travel first-class, of course, and in the nonsmokers'
compartment of the railway. He could not stand smoke. One day a
very expensive lad y entered the compartment, and sure enough, she
pulled out her cigarette case and offered it to Sir Thomas. Irascible as
he was, he shouted, "Don't you know it's a nonsmoker?" "Yes," she
says, "but I do like to smoke." He answered, "Madam, if you smoke,
I shall throw up." This outraged her; she pulled herself up and said,
"How dare you use such language to me? I have some influence on
this line. I am one of the directors' wives." To which Sir Thomas:
"Madam, even if you were the only wife of the director, I would still
throw up."
I feel we are beginning to see some students who are in tha t
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pos1t10n when it comes to science instruction. No matter what we
offer them , they a re likely to reject it forcibly. Some of you here
today a re not scientists, so you might perhaps be tempted for a mom ent to take a certain sa tisfac tion in having it happen to those overly
successful scientists ; but m y fear is tha t wha t is going on now is a
p recursor of something tha t'll come to all our various subjects.
L et us first look at the meanings of science. There is Francis
Bacon's remark: Science should be pursued for the glory of God and
for the relief of m an's esta te. But tha t slogan is very solipsistic. One's
own gods, one's own estate. A century earlier the same slogan h ad
been the ba ttle cry for Piza rro and Cortez, for murdering right and
left and plundering a continent. Science too can be carried on in the
m anner tha t colonization was carried on, and so some of our students
invite us to examine the slogan instead of accepting it blindly.
There a re other views, too. I sha re the belief tha t science should
be considered a central pa rt of our cultu ral heritage and that this
must be brought across to our students, p articula rly in a General
Education course. In addition, science is of course also the personal
activity of real people, a nd so we should also take care to stress that
science is a style of life, with its own ethos, with its own intellectual
and social rewards, with its own excitement ; after all, tha t's what
keeps us in science in the first place. Somehow we don't share this
sufficiently with our students, sometimes not even with our graduate
students. No wonder tha t from the outside it sometimes appears that
science is an entertainment for a few.
To turn to two aspects which I'd like to treat in some detail later,
science can be seen as a study in which many different a reas of human
thought are unified in a striking way; and, on the other hand, science
can be considered a mirror of society, for good or ill: the mirror of
a society which treasures m erit as a chief criterion of democratic
process, but which also has dedicated itself with singula r skill to
violence. I thought the rem arks of the retiring president of your
Associa tion this evening very much to that point (see p age 42-Ed.) .
Let me go back to Bacon' s definition , which only echoes a more
ancient one, that of Pla to, one that I've found perhaps the most
insightful way of putting tha t view of science. In Book Seven of Th e
R epublic, Socrates lcmd Glaucon a re talking. They' re not really discussing. G laucon just says "yes" and " no" as usual, since this was in the
days befo re real dialogue a nd the like; teaching was more of a linear,
unidirectional process. Socrates explains why a young ruler in the
ideal sta te should study mathematics or, by implication, any science
at all. This knowledge has a double use : milita ry and philosophical.
The student will someday become a m an of wa r, and the man of
wa r m ust learn the art of numbers or he will not know how to a rrange
his troops. And as a philosopher he must also learn ma thematics
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because in this way he can rise out of the sea of change and lay hold
of true being as reflected in the certainty of mathematical knowledge,
which would be the easy way for the soul to pass from becoming to
truth and to being. This is the double mission, then, of science: to
help you serve the state, and to help you serve your soul.
La ter in The Laws, Book Twelve, Pla to raises again these arguments for the study of science by the future ruler or m agistrate. One
motive for believing in the divine is the perception of orderliness in
the motion of planets and other bodies, "swayed by the Mind tha t
has set this whole frame of things in comely array." In this light, the
study of astronomy is an antidote for a theism, for there is "aroused
in the breast of close students the suspicion, which has now been
converted into accepted doctrine, tha t, were the planets without souls,
and by consequence without intelligence, they would never h ave conformed to such precise computations. So the prime purpose of astronomy is not, let's say, the detailed study of the precession of the
equinox, upon which the Platonist heaps scorn, but ra ther it is moral
philosophy. That's the social relevance of astronomy in Pla to's
thought: it conduces to the moral education of the young.
I think you see the point I'm hinting at. There is a danger that
today we may fall into a similar trap. Nam ely, we m ay foster the
study of science, not chiefly for its own sake, but chiefly for the sake
of its possible social relevance, though to be sure, of a kind different
than in Plato's day. The very word science nowadays seems to bring
to mind a set of problems such as the conflicts between the needs of
science a nd the priorities and processes of government: the arms race,
the role of science in helping to clean up pollution, and the like.
Now, as you will see, I shall want to t ake this point of view very
seriously, and it is an important component of teaching science. I
shall presently make a model for this science-society interrela tion, and
use the model to lea rn something about science instruction. But after
I get done with it, there is another of the aspects of science and social
relevance, one tha t rarely gets into science texts. For a work of science
sometimes is also a way to exhibit and measure much that is valuable
in human thought quite outside science itself, just as, conversely, the
enthusiastic involvement of some scientists-not many, but enough on
both sides of the Iron Curtain- in continuing to escalate the arms
race in this age of overkill is one aspect of societies unable to pursue
sane ways of na tional and interna tional life. So science is a kind of
thermometer, one that measures the health and sickness of our times.
And the same, incidentally, might be said of all scholarship. This is
why I believe if the stand is not m ade firmly enough in the sciences,
eventually anti-intellectualism will be sweeping that much more easily
through the other fields as well. The downturn in basic research
money, the a ttack on the Foundations, the dropping of many na tional
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educational programs, the blacklisting of good scientists, the drafting
of gradua te students, even the way in which the Apollo program has
put its own basic scientific research on the back burner-these are
all straws in the wind, and I believe they a re not simply anti-science.
H ere is something which your Association might well study. The educational institutions as a whole a re of course under attack from Right
and Left. Some of the young rebels think, a nd to a degree they are
right, tha t educational policy tends to be set primarily not by our
d esire to pursue truth, but by the function of schools to provide
human resources for industrial and military institutions. H ence they
attack " the system" at the place closest a t hand, namely, their own
school. Little do they see that their tactics in many cases merely
reinforce the anti-intellectualism and a nti-humanism which plague the
system in the first place.
Now let me examine one part of Plato's and Bacon's double
definition a bit more: science as socially relevant power. The academic
usually prefers to keep this aspect out of his class discussion, a nd
treats science as if it were a subj ect in a sealed box without inputs
and outputs-the way a few of m y fri ends in the humanities seem to
think of Shakespeare as a book on a shelf, not associated with the
living performance of the play. And indeed the academic is likely
to be self-selected from tha t part of the population that likes to narrow
down big problems, and is good a t doing it this way. M any problems
do yield to this kind of an attack, and one's subject is also easier to
teach in reductionist terms. But no sooner do we really try to do any
science than we see that scientific work is part of a ch ain of activities
that stretches outside the lab a nd the present, a chain crudely indicated
by the symbols [SCIENCE]+[TECHNOLOGY}+[SOCIETY]->[SCIENCE]->- [TECHNOLOGY], etc. We are of course not in an
hermetically sealed box tha t contains just our friends and our lab and
our students. We are more like circuit elements in a complex network in
which information and energy flow in and flow out. Examples from the
history of science come to mind immedia tely. Think of how Faraday's
work in electromagnetism was followed by motors and generators, much
appreciated and used by society a t large. As soon as Faraday's work was
incorporated into technological advances, things could happen which
neither a Faraday nor an Edison could h ave predicted. For example,
there was a rapid expansion in the scale of cities because of increase
in the transportation capabilities, both horizontally, by streetcars, and
vertically, by elevators. The city's shape was affected within a few
decades by the technological potential of Faraday's first little toy.
Or think of using this simple chain-like model on the consequences
of the work of Fermi and his group in Rome, who discovered by
accident slow neutron fission without even knowing it for some years.
They found a remarkable effect which, a decade la ter, with Los
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Alamos, is found to be a t the base of the technology of nuclea r weapons. Their use in wa r, of course, was determined by the forces of
societies in conflict. And then on again to the effect upon science
itself, through the extraordinary force feeding of nuclear physics and
nuclear engineering after the war. And then follows yet another a rrow
to Society, in the sense that soon half of the wattage of newly-built
electric power plants will come from nuclear power. Such examples
can be repea ted again and again. But one rarely talks about it in our
science classes.
I'd like to m ake a few comments about this linear, " classical"
model of the relation between science and society. First of all, of
course, it' s oversimplified ; the idea that science, or society, can be represented by a box. Moreover, the words a re catch phrases. Science and
technology a re often difficult to separate, and often a re sequentially interlocked- [SCIENCE]-HTECHNOLOGY]+[SCIENCE]+[TECHNOLOGY]-as in a loop . Thus an adva nce in solid-sta te physics p ermits m aking instruments that allow you to m ake very much faster
measurements which allow you to solve scientific research problems
involving a timescale that was previously not reachable, and so forth.
Another obvious point is that each of these operators or elements,
particularly the arrow, is one of considerable complexity. These things
don't h appen by themselves. Los Alamos did not suddenly appear in
order to reap the benefi ts of Fermi's, H ahn and Strassm ann's, M eitner
a nd Frisch's discoveries. General Electric did not just m a terialize at
the end of an a rrow leading from pure aerodynamics to the supersonic transport plane, which will cost the na tion a n estimated $5 .3
billion dolla rs before the first production model will fly. There were
people who were quite busy to make it all happen , who shaped the
arrow and pointed it in a direction pleasing to them.
And this is just the place where there is a breakdown of the
classical laissez-faire scheme-where there is supposed to be a sufficient diversity of motives and a free competition of moderately-sized
groups, so that the net result is a kind of accommodation or general
consensus that leads society on as if guided by some unseen hand, one
tha t never favors one interest group excessively a t the cost of the
others. Now a few gigantic force concentrations come into play, of a
kind that would have frightened Adam Smith.
Edison was of course a powerful m an ; when he wanted to have
his pa rticular kind of generating plant at Niagara Falls, he went a t it
with all the fierceness of a modern lobbyist. But he was peanuts comp a red to the kind of mobilization now routinely imposing its corporate
will upon the popula tion. Think again of the SST, for example, where
virtually all the independent scientific ad vice has been negative-and
now we are m ade to have it anyway. Think of the use of herbicides
and defoliants in Vietnam, where in 1961 a small first test was m ade
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by the D.O.D. of the effectiveness of certain defoliants on small strips
of land, about a hundred feet wide on each side of a highway. It
worked there-and then was immensely escalated. H alf a million
acres at a time h ave been sprayed. The ecological consequences in this
climate have never been checked out, nor what happens to people who
routinely have to ingest the stuff. These are examples ofa step-function
change injected into the science-technology-society chain, when a
m any-order-of-magnitude change is imposed on the landscape, a substantial part of the planet being affected very suddenly by the decision
of a very few without attention being paid even to the scientific community to check sufficiently wha t the ecological or medical consequences might well be. It's precisely here that trouble a rises in the
rela tion of science and society. When the direction of the arrow from
one to the other is not the vector sum of many manageably small
impulses-something near to, but better than, random walk-that
di rection can be subject to flip-flop oscillation. As a circuit engineer
would put it by analogy, it is a n unstable system.
There is a nother reason why the system I h ave sketched now is
unlikely naturally to follow the will of the m ajority in the usual
democratic process. The time span h as become shorter a nd shorter
between a scientific adva nce, the p erfection of its possibility for
technological exploitation, and the adoption of this development by
the consumer at large. Comparing the F araday story and the F ermi
story shows tha t the time lag between scientific innovation and widespread adoption of technical devices used to be of the order of thirty
to fifty years in the 19th century, long enough for some kind of social
consensus to be brought to bear on the process itself. But it was down
to fifteen years in the Fermi case, and has been fu rther shrinking since.
The NSF h as recently released an in-house stud y of the time sequence
between fundamental research and technological research or, as they
call it, nonmission research a nd mission research. The report is called
T races and contains examples, from the birth control pill to video
tape recorders, showing where the fundamental scientific and technical ad vances were in each case. The time delay is no longer thirty
to fifty years, but now more on the order of ten years, a nd I believe
in some fields it is down to five years or less. That was true of the
time elapsed between the design of the fi rst nose cone of an American
missile a nd the time the actual used object, after being fired on the test
range, turned up at the door of the Smithsonian to be put on public
exhibit. I believe there must be a n atu ral lower limit for transforming
a basic scientific advance into innovative technology-something like
three years, for this is about the time it takes for a bright graduate
student to get his doctorate in engineering. If the metabolism gets
faster than that, he will be out of da te before his own doctorate thesis
has been finished.
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Let us hope the metabolism will not get more rapid tha n tha t.
But in the present system of imposing decisions with large-scale consequences, it is even now far too rapid for calm assessment of the
usefulness a nd dangers of technology by a wide enough portion of the
informed citizenry. L arge scale modifications of national life and
n ational priorities are made before the wisdom of the priorities, the
commitment and its direction and opportunity costs have been sufficiently scrutinized. (The manned space program is an example.)
Moreover, m any of the attempts at technology assessment are not
made where the public can enter a t all, but behind a screen of confidentiality, even where n ational security is not involved. (To test this,
try to get hold of the va rious official reports in the SST case.) As
Oppenheimer once said, the trouble with secrecy in debates on technical matters is tha t truth itself is unlikely to flourish except in the
milieu created by open a nd free discussion.
In terms of our model, therefore, when the time-scale aspect of
the a rrows between the " boxes" gets so short, when the interested
p arties can keep discussion from flourishing and can push the arrow to
point in the direction of interest to them, and when order-of-m agnitude
changes are injected in the system, then the system can indeed become
unstable. A circuit engineer would immediately know what is needed
to stabilize it- namely, feedback loops. This means one must first try
out on a small and open test scale wha t the result of the introduction
of a technological decision is, particula rly if it is intended to be m ade
eventually on a large scale, and more p articularly if this is intended
by powerful, interested parties. Then the test results must be fed back
through the boxes to modify the innova tion and the decision to deploy
as needed .
For example, the food industry apparently h as h ad it in its power
to put some 680 additives on the approved list so far without detailed
checking; the Food and Drug Administration calls them Generally
Regarded As Safe (GRAS ). (I've always thought, who is this General
who regards it as safe? It must be General Foods or General Mills.)
We are now beginning to see the need to inject a probe into the
output end of the food technology box to test more carefully, over a
longer time span, whether indeed the proposed la rge-arrow injection
into society will be generally safe. As Sena tor McGovern said recently,
instead of the GRAS list we need a PAS list- Proven As Safe-for
all food additives and drugs, and, in my own view, also for any technological device or, for tha t m atter, any large-scale educa tional
experiment. Until it passes extensive tests, the device or innova tion
should be clea rly labeled as bearing the onus of being untested and
perhaps unsafe. So my suggestion is that between these boxes there
ought to be a pass-inspection requirement to see whether in fact the
total spectrum of main and side effects is such as to leave the system
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in equilibrium and provide social benefits as judged on widely acceptable grounds.
Now here is exactly where, in a new way, science as a profession
and science teaching come in. Such an examination system will require
detailed scientific work. There are at present very few people employed
in this kind of profession, namely the scientific assessor who can make
these d elicate, difficult tests of the outputs of technology to find out
whether the effects are in fact tolerable. Moreover, there may be a
great deal of resistance against going into that kind of socially relevant scientific activity. Yet, it seems to me that it will have to come
soon, if science is to remain in good repute. No matter how pure,
subtle, sophisticated, and beautiful the subject may be to us as we
pursue it in that box of our own, under the present system of motivations the leakage out of tha t box into the next ones, into technology
and then into society, will increasingly befoul the reputation of all,
even the purest sciences, unless there is some scientific assessment or
pass-inspection introduced routinely into the system.
I find that a few engineers, and also some "pure" scientists, are
beginning to think along these lines. At MIT there are groups of
faculty members who have begun to look for funds and set up laboratories for this purpose of assessment. But such labs will have another
purpose also, and this introduces a n additional point of importance
that is not widely appreciated. M any of the m ajor problems facing
society as a by-product of technological advance cannot be cured or
even properly understood unless some new scientific advances are
made. This gives a whole new m anda te and a whole new range of
expectations for basic research in science. For example, the problem
of overpopulation is to some degree due to scientific ignorance of the
basic processes of conception and of hormonal action. Population
control is still waiting for ad vances in pure science. Arms control
treaties are to some degree less likely because of areas of ignorance
in geophysics that are, for example, making inspection by seismic means
difficult. Bringing food to hungry people in desert areas near the sea,
as in Peru and Egypt, is mostly a political problem, as so many are,
but to some degree also a problem of basic science: not until we
have more fundamental knowledge about the structure of liquids or
the transport phenomena in membranes will we have really cheap desalination plants. And, for that matter, we need to know more about
the basic metabolism of plants to see how one might grow food plants
in saline water. Pollution is a m atter of greed and stupidity, lack of
law enforcement and apathy. But to clean up smog-ridden areas it is
also necessary to know far more about basic processes in combustion
chemistry. Scientific advances in such areas will allow us to feed
scientific information into the technological box so that the next output does not need to be that ha rmful.
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When our students ask about the social relevance of science, I
believe they want to see, first of all, the model as a whole a nd how
it works in specific cases, and secondly, they would like to be reassured that their teachers, or those people whom their teachers respect
as scientists, do not all want their work to be carried on only within
closed little boxes, but tha t some of them also, at least from time to
time, act as monitors, inspectors, assessors in the feedback-loop p art
of the more d ynamic or cybernetic model I have proposed.
I have no doubt that in the long run our students, our colleagues,
our congressmen, and the public a t large will have to get used to this
ecological way of thinking about the process of science as it connects
with society, and to judge the relevance of science a t least in pa rt in
terms of the essential need to have science come to the rescue of the
system. I see no other way in which it can possibly be stabilizing
itself. A hopeful, perhaps even hea rtwarming evidence tha t thi s type
of talk is not only talk is what h as lately been ha ppening a t the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. The AAAS is,
so to speak, the intellectual trade union of scientists across the board
with about 130,000 members. For some time m embers of the Boa rd of
the AAAS have looked at ways of re-dedicating their society to its
original charter purpose, announced over a century ago, namely to
further the pursuit of science for human welfa re. W e have identified
ten main problems in human welfare, ranging from hunger and m alnutrition, population pressure, the quali ty of life and the like to an
understanding of science itself, a nd we have dedicated ourselves
strongly to a n enla rgement of our purpose, effectiveness, and audience.
One hopes that one can gather up a good pa rt of the nea rly one
million scientists and engineers in this country to obtain the widest
possible base on which a good fraction of them, at least part of their
time, in consulting or otherwise, will involve themselves in the conscious and specific pursuit of science for human welfare-not to the
exclusion of science for its own sake, but as a safeguard for its beneficent survival.
Now let us leave the aspect of science as power- not m erely
power to array your troops, but, better yet, power to inspect a nd
enforce a treaty that avoids arraying troops-and let us go a t least
very briefly to the second part of Pla to's double definitio n: science as
pure thought, and hence as education of the soul. Here, too, our
model is of some use, for there are input a rrows into the science "box"
tha t come from outside science itself. Faraday did not invent his
electromagnetism out of thin air. R ather, he was prompted by an
interest in Natur Philosophie, a movement which counts Goethe
as its most prominent propagandist, and which to this day has quite
a n appeal to some. It is a philosophy that looks for la rge, overarching
h armonies and unities among all fields of thought. Faraday was much
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caught up with this, and his search in physics for an effect which
showed that electricity and magnetism a re not two unrelated parts
of science was a way of doing experimental philosophy.
Something like it was true for Newton, a devoted student of the
metaphysician Henry More, whose teachings Newton echoes in his
sections on the nature of time a nd space in the Principia. Again,
Einstein's impulse towa rd relativity did not come from trying to solve
some piddling problem in physics. R ather, a t the beginning, Einstein
was deeply under the influence of the kind of neopositivism that is
most closely identified with Ernst M ach, and to him the main task
was to find a new way of looking a t space and time so that it fulfilled the operational criteria of meaning. At the beginning of the
relativity paper of 1905, tha t's what you find as the important message. The kinematics is prefaced by definitions of space and time,
just as Newton, too, wanted first of all to get straight the meaning of
space and time, working with ideas he had first heard from a philosopher. The point I'm trying to make is that when science is done
at its best-and I hope tha t in each of our courses this is the main
purpose, to show our students science at its best through the work of
a Faraday, a Newton, a n Einstein- it goes beyond its narrow confines
and encompasses and illumina tes the whole structure of thought of
the time.
One could proliferate examples of this sort, none more intriguing
tha n the case of Niels Bohr. When Niels Bohr fi rst got into physics,
the rath er comfortable notion held sway tha t there is an independent
world out there towa rd which we, as if on the other side of some
moving frontier, relentlessly progress in the unfolding of scientific
knowledge. A key idea was the independence of the observer from the
physical process which he studies. For example, in the study of a
moving object, a billia rd ball if you will, the path is apparently not
influenced by the fact that you're looking a t it. The assumption is
tha t your act of shining light from this moving ball will not disturb,
or couple to, the motion of this ba ll, but leave it uncha nged . And the
same assumption was made throughout physics. But by 1927 it became clear to Niels Bohr that this ancien t principle of decoupling
between the observer and the observed prevented one from understanding wha t was going on in quantum mechanics.
For example, depending on how you set up the experiment, depending on what the observer decides to look a t, he can see one
aspect of light or the other, either the wave or the pa rticle aspect.
Bohr realized it is futile to t ry to reduce the one to the other, to
dissolve these antithetical ways of thinking about the phenomena of
light. Our knowledge of light is really the su perposition of the evid ence of different kinds of experiments, in which we behave differently,
our gadgets are different, what we look at is different ; and it is the
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layer cake of all those experimental reports, some of which appear to
be contradictory to each other, which defines "light."
Now to deal in this way with apparently contradictory ideas, and
to regard them as complementary, was something for which physics
h ad not been prepared at all. Where did Bohr get this idea? H e never
was very successful in expressing himself on this point, but he gave
hints throughout his life. W e now know that in his youth Niels Bohr,
the son of the physiologist Christian Bohr, was allowed to sit in on
the shop club on philosophical topics which his fat her ran, and that
he was profoundly influenced both by this experience and by Christian
Bohr's own complementa ristic way of thinking about biology-accepting the merits of physicalistic reductionism without entirely denying
the m erits also of vitalistic ideas. A number of scholars h ave studied
the possibilities of other early influences on Bohr, including L. Rosenfeld, K. M ayer-Abich, M . J ammer, and T. S. Kuhn. The details h ave
not yet been fully sorted out, but there are tantalizing cues that Bohr
was much attracted to the writings of Kierkegaard, William J ames,
and H0ffding who, in different ways, were struggling with aspects of
complementarity in psychology and philosophy. What we discover, in
other words, is tha t the most recent of the really great new ideas in
physics of our time, which was the complementarity principle, may
well have been t riggered not a t all just by somethi ng present in a box
called physics, but by something which came from the outside, from
humanistic studies among others.
I must now end because I know tha t both your patience and the
tape recorder will be exhausted. But I should summarize the implications of these points for the teaching of science. At the top I would
put the need to teach the most important ideas of science themselves.
One must respect science still above all on its own terms. That's the
bulwark agai nst an anti-intellectualism tha t could be sweeping through
this and all other fields. Yielding to uninformed pressures to concentrate on something "interesting" puts you on a slippery slope that
can quickly lead to astrology and ESP. The subject matter of science
has to be our anchor, and indeed I think the best students would be
feeling cheated most if one didn't make the subject m atter very
central.
But we must also show how the important ideas cam e into being.
When you do this seriously you may discover that you need the help
not just of your physics colleagues but also your other colleagues,
whether they be philosophers, psychologists, or historians. To discuss
adequately major contributions to science such as those I have mentioned today, particularly in a class containing man y non-scientists, it
is in my view necessary to show the input from the humanities as well.
That kind of a relevance, namely the scientific ad vance as the culminating point of a whole movement of ideas from various fields, is
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one which helps to do justice to the dignity of our enterprise.
Teaching science humanistically means showing the inputs from,
and outputs to, many other fields. I appreciate that some do not feel
entirely competent to teach it this way, and certainly I often feel that
way myself. But that is what the idea of academia is all about: we
have colleagues with whom to consult, a nd that will bring us together with them a bit more ; and with our students, we can make
it frankly a joint exploration of something to be newly learned by the
students together with us.
Seeing science clearly requires that we locate it properly in a
social matrix of action, which means tha t we have to have some
adequate cybernetic model. This can direct the attention of our students to those places within the model where they, if particularly
interested in releva nt activity, can play their own part; even if they
don't become scientists, they can have roles as monitors and consumers
of science-alert to scientific events and social consequences.
L ast but not least, if science is a style of life, we ought to get
our students to share that style of life with us. I am afraid this does
mean more personal interaction, more time spent, than many of us
are in the habit of allowing except for graduate students or postdoctorates. And they should share in more than just the life of the
lab, but also in your other concerns, to get the widest view of your
activities as a scientist and citizen-not to be locked up in a lab, but
to go out, say to the meetings of the societies, including AAAS or
SSRS or PAS, to meetings where scientists debate how, to some degree,
to ta ke a valid part in shaping the destiny of society. We might well
somehow adopt a few apt students, and let them intellectually live
with us, not only when we are thinking about physics or chemistry or
biology, but also when we are thinking about their applications or
other consequences, when we act as consultants or feel upset about
the abuse of science and write to our congressman, or when we go to
meetings to which we might well bring a younger counterpart to
listen and to debate on what it is that animates and excites us. In
this way we shall, I think, do justice to science in the many, splendid
meanings of the word.
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